ArticleScientific reports2016
Small groups and long memories promote cooperation.
Article in Scientific reports, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 28 papers.
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Who cites it
28 citing papers in PubMed, 74 citations in OpenAlex.
- Article
- Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric public goods games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- A multi-agent reinforcement learning framework for exploring dominant strategies in iterated and evolutionary games.Nature communications · 2025Article
- Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games.Nature communications · 2025Article
- Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.Dynamic games and applications · 2025Article
- Conditional cooperation with longer memory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Behavioural strategies in simultaneous and alternating prisoner's dilemma games with/without voluntary participation.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Review
- Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- The evolution of universal cooperation.Science advances · 2023Article
- Group reciprocity and the evolution of stereotyping.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games.PNAS nexus · 2022Article
- Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces.PLoS computational biology · 2022Article
- Limited memory optimizes cooperation in social dilemma experiments.Royal Society open science · 2021Article
- An interplay of resource availability, population size and mutation rate potentiates the evolution of metabolic signaling.BMC ecology and evolution · 2021Article
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Authors and funding
2 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.
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No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists the question is often how group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, can emerge and persist in an evolving system. Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. We construct a coordinate system for memory-m strategies in iterated n-player games that permits us to characterize all cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that, especially when groups are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. We also explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory. We find that even when memory has a cost, longer-memory strategies often evolve, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation, even when the benefits for cooperation are low.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.