ArticleJournal of market access & health policy2014
Health economic value of an innovation: delimiting the scope and framework of future market entry agreements.
Article in Journal of market access & health policy, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.
- Mapping the landscape of managed entry agreements: a systematic review of global frameworks, system-level components, and implementation challenges.Frontiers in pharmacology · 2026Pooled it
- Design and Features of Pricing and Payment Schemes for Health Technologies: A Scoping Review and a Proposal for a Flexible Need-Driven Classification.PharmacoEconomics · 2025Article
- Mapping Payment and Pricing Schemes for Health Innovation: Protocol of a Scoping Literature Review.PharmacoEconomics - open · 2024Article
- Barriers and Opportunities for Implementation of Outcome-Based Spread Payments for High-Cost, One-Shot Curative Therapies.Frontiers in pharmacology · 2020Review
- Performance-Based Risk-Sharing Arrangements: An Updated International Review.PharmacoEconomics · 2017Review
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
5 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
BACKGROUND AND
objectivesThe objective of our paper is to offer a new, payer-friendly taxonomy of market entry agreements (MEAs) that aims to twin contracts with their methodological designs in an effort to clarify the distinction between contracts that are based on performance and those that are based on demonstrated effect.
methodsOur analysis proceeds in two stages: First, we delimit the scope and framework of pay for performance (P4P) and pay for demonstrated effect (P4E) agreements. Second, we distinguish the methodological designs supporting the implementation of each of these contracts.
resultsWe elucidate why P4P contracts prevent the payer from funding the true effectiveness of an innovation by expanding on their limitations. These include: 1) the normative nature of comparisons, 2) the impossibility of true effect imputability for each individual, and 3) the use of intermediary outcome measures. We then explore three main criticisms that payers must take into account when reasoning in terms of performance rather than in terms of the product effectiveness.
conclusionThe potential effect that performance-based reimbursements may have on dissociating the components of the cost-effectiveness ratio constitutes an obstacle to a true health economic reasoning.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.