ArticleJournal of mathematical biology2016
Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies.
Article in Journal of mathematical biology, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
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4 citing papers in PubMed.
- Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- Are Adaptive Chemotherapy Schedules Robust? A Three-Strategy Stochastic Evolutionary Game Theory Model.Cancers · 2021Article
- Fixation probabilities for the Moran process with three or more strategies: general and coupling results.Journal of mathematical biology · 2020Article
- Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics.Journal of mathematical biology · 2019Article
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2 authors.
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Abstract
We study a population of individuals playing the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma under replicator dynamics. The population consists of three kinds of individuals adopting the following reactive strategies: ALLD (individuals which always defect), ATFT (almost tit-for-tat: individuals which almost always repeat the opponent's last move) and G (generous individuals, which always cooperate when the opponent cooperated in the last move and have a positive probability q of cooperating when their opponent has defected). Our aim is studying in a mathematically rigorous fashion the dynamics of a simplified version for the computer experiment in Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 355:250-253, 1992) involving 100 reactive strategies. We see that as the generosity degree of the G individuals varies, equilibria (rest points) of the dynamics appear or disappear, and the dynamics changes accordingly. Not only we prove that the results of the experiment are true in our simplified version, but we also have complete control on the existence or non-existence of the equilbria for the dynamics for all possible values of the parameters, given that ATFT individuals are close enough to TFT. For most values of the parameters the dynamics can be completely determined.
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