ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2016
Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces.
Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 21 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
21 citing papers in PubMed.
- A game-theoretic attack-defense framework for the study of network resilience.Nature communications · 2026Article
- Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- A multi-agent reinforcement learning framework for exploring dominant strategies in iterated and evolutionary games.Nature communications · 2025Article
- Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- Article
- Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation.PNAS nexus · 2023Article
- Group reciprocity and the evolution of stereotyping.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces.PLoS computational biology · 2022Article
- Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints.Nature communications · 2022Article
- Mitigation of block withholding attack based on zero-determinant strategy.PeerJ. Computer science · 2022Article
- A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity.Nature human behaviour · 2021Article
- Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games.Royal Society open science · 2021Article
- Evolving cooperation in multichannel games.Nature communications · 2020Article
- Article
- Social dilemmas among unequals.Nature · 2019Article
- Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain.Nature communications · 2019Article
- Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2016Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The recent discovery of zero-determinant strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma sparked a surge of interest in the surprising fact that a player can exert unilateral control over iterated interactions. These remarkable strategies, however, are known to exist only in games in which players choose between two alternative actions such as "cooperate" and "defect." Here we introduce a broader class of autocratic strategies by extending zero-determinant strategies to iterated games with more general action spaces. We use the continuous donation game as an example, which represents an instance of the prisoner's dilemma that intuitively extends to a continuous range of cooperation levels. Surprisingly, despite the fact that the opponent has infinitely many donation levels from which to choose, a player can devise an autocratic strategy to enforce a linear relationship between his or her payoff and that of the opponent even when restricting his or her actions to merely two discrete levels of cooperation. In particular, a player can use such a strategy to extort an unfair share of the payoffs from the opponent. Therefore, although the action space of the continuous donation game dwarfs that of the classic prisoner's dilemma, players can still devise relatively simple autocratic and, in particular, extortionate strategies.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.