ArticleThe Linacre quarterly2015
Of wholes and parts: A Thomistic refutation of "Brain Death".
Article in The Linacre quarterly, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.
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Who cites it
9 citing papers in PubMed, 21 citations in OpenAlex.
- A structured analysis of the concept of brain death.Theoretical medicine and bioethics · 2026Article
- Diagnosing death: the "fuzzy area" between life and decomposition.Theoretical medicine and bioethics · 2021Article
- Does the Uniform Determination of Death Act Need to Be Revised?The Linacre quarterly · 2020Article
- Evolution of the Criteria of "Brain Death": A Critical Analysis Based on Scientific Realism and Christian Anthropology.The Linacre quarterly · 2019Article
- Organ Donation and Declaration of Death: Combined Neurologic and Cardiopulmonary Standards.The Linacre quarterly · 2019Article
- Death, unity, and the brain.Theoretical medicine and bioethics · 2019Article
- Pope John Paul II and the neurological standard for the determination of death: A critical analysis of his address to the Transplantation Society.The Linacre quarterly · 2017Article
- Letter to the Editor.The Linacre quarterly · 2015Article
- A Thomistic defense of whole-brain death.The Linacre quarterly · 2015Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
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Abstract
I propose a refutation of the two major arguments that support the concept of "brain death" as an ontological equivalent to death of the human organism. I begin with a critique of the notion that a body part, such as the brain, could act as "integrator" of a whole body. I then proceed with a rebuttal of the argument that destruction of a body part essential for rational operations-such as the brain-necessarily entails that the remaining whole is indisposed to accrue a rational soul. Next, I point to the equivocal use of the terms "alive" or "living" as being at the root of conceptual errors about brain death. I appeal to the Thomistic definition of life and to the hylomorphic concept of "virtual presence" to clarify this confusion. Finally, I show how the Thomistic definition of life supports the traditional criterion for the determination of death. Lay summary: By the mid-1960s, medical technology became available that could keep "alive" the bodies of patients who had sustained complete and irreversible brain injury. The concept of "brain death" emerged to describe such states. Physicians, philosophers, and ethicists then proposed that the state of brain death is equivalent to the state of death traditionally identified by the absence of spontaneous pulse and respiration. This article challenges the major philosophical arguments that have been advanced to draw this equivalence.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.