Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26824895›Full record

ArticlePloS one2016

Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.

Szabolcs Számadó, Ferenc Szalai, István Scheuring

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
5.2field-weighted citation impact, top 5% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed, 22 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  3. The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Review
  4. Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  5. The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Szabolcs SzámadóMTA-ELTE Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology Research Group, Pázmány Péter sétány, 1/c, H-1117, Budapest, Hungary.
Ferenc SzalaiEngame Academy, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky u. 50, 1054, Budapest, Hungary.
István ScheuringMTA-ELTE Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology Research Group, Pázmány Péter sétány, 1/c, H-1117, Budapest, Hungary.
Eötvös Loránd University · HU

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is often claimed as one of the key mechanisms of human cooperation. It works only if there is a reputational score keeping and each individual can inform with high probability which other individuals were good or bad in the previous round. Gossip is often proposed as a mechanism that can maintain such coherence of reputations in the face of errors of transmission. Random errors, however, are not the only source of uncertainty in such situations. The possibility of deceptive communication, where the signallers aim to misinform the receiver cannot be excluded. While there is plenty of evidence for deceptive communication in humans the possibility of deception is not yet incorporated into models of indirect reciprocity. Here we show that when deceptive strategies are allowed in the population it will cause the collapse of the coherence of reputations and thus in turn it results the collapse of cooperation. This collapse is independent of the norms and the cost and benefit values. It is due to the fact that there is no selection for honest communication in the framework of indirect reciprocity. It follows that indirect reciprocity can be only proposed plausibly as a mechanism of human cooperation if additional mechanisms are specified in the model that maintains honesty.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorDeceptionGames, ExperimentalModels, PsychologicalCommunicationHumansUncertainty

Identifiers

PMID26824895
PMCPMC4732813
OpenAlexW2411931505

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.