Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26808261›Full record

ArticlePLoS computational biology2016

Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies.

Fernando P Santos, Francisco C Santos, Jorge M Pacheco

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS computational biology, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 26 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
26citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

26 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Picking strategies in games of cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  7. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  8. A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. The complexity of human cooperation under indirect reciprocity.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Review
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2018
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Fernando P SantosINESC-ID and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, IST-Tagusparque, Porto Salvo, Portugal.
Francisco C SantosINESC-ID and Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, IST-Tagusparque, Porto Salvo, Portugal.
Jorge M PachecoATP-Group, Lisboa, Portugal.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity, besides providing a convenient framework to address the evolution of moral systems, offers a simple and plausible explanation for the prevalence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. By helping someone, an individual may increase her/his reputation, which may change the pre-disposition of others to help her/him in the future. This, however, depends on what is reckoned as a good or a bad action, i.e., on the adopted social norm responsible for raising or damaging a reputation. In particular, it remains an open question which social norms are able to foster cooperation in small-scale societies, while enduring the wide plethora of stochastic affects inherent to finite populations. Here we address this problem by studying the stochastic dynamics of cooperation under distinct social norms, showing that the leading norms capable of promoting cooperation depend on the community size. However, only a single norm systematically leads to the highest cooperative standards in small communities. That simple norm dictates that only whoever cooperates with good individuals, and defects against bad ones, deserves a good reputation, a pattern that proves robust to errors, mutations and variations in the intensity of selection.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorModels, PsychologicalSocial NormsComputational BiologyHumans

Identifiers

PMID26808261
PMCPMC4726523

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.