Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26769984›Full record

ArticleThe quarterly journal of economics2015

THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.

Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Paul Schrimpf

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The quarterly journal of economics, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 24 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
24citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

24 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Forward-looking Behavior in Health Insurance.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
  3. The Health Costs of Cost Sharing.The quarterly journal of economics · 2024
    Article
  4. Time Aggregation in Health Insurance Deductibles.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2024
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Payment systems and hospital length of stay: a bunching-based evidence.International journal of health economics and management · 2019
    Article
  12. Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals.Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society · 2018
    Article
  13. Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It.Journal of the European Economic Association · 2018
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Health care demand elasticities by type of service.Journal of health economics · 2017
    Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Liran EinavStanford University and NBER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER, University of British Columbia.
Amy FinkelsteinStanford University and NBER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER, University of British Columbia.
Paul SchrimpfStanford University and NBER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER, University of British Columbia.

Funding

Determinants of Elderly Health: The Role of Place-Based FactorsR37AG032449 · NIA · MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY · PI FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2020 to 2025
$5.9M
The Design of Social Insurance for the Elderly: Public Pensions & Health InsurancR01AG032449 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI EINAV, LIRAN, FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2009 to 2019
$5.6M
NIA NIH HHS R01 AG032449NIA NIH HHS R37 AG032449
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We study the demand response to non-linear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in individuals' budget set created by the famous "donut hole," where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin, to provide descriptive evidence of the drug purchase response to a price increase. We then specify and estimate a simple dynamic model of drug use that allows us to quantify the spending response along the entire non-linear budget set. We use the model for counterfactual analysis of the increase in spending from "filling" the donut hole, as will be required by 2020 under the Affordable Care Act. In our baseline model, which considers spending decisions within a single year, we estimate that "filling" the donut hole will increase annual drug spending by about $150, or about 8 percent. About one-quarter of this spending increase reflects "anticipatory" behavior, coming from beneficiaries whose spending prior to the policy change would leave them short of reaching the donut hole. We also present descriptive evidence of cross-year substitution of spending by individuals who reach the kink, which motivates a simple extension to our baseline model that allows - in a highly stylized way - for individuals to engage in such cross year substitution. Our estimates from this extension suggest that a large share of the $150 drug spending increase could be attributed to cross-year substitution, and the net increase could be as little as $45 per year.

Identifiers

PMID26769984
PMCPMC4710380

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.