Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26656692›Full record

ArticleJournal of virology2016

Predicting Disease Severity and Viral Spread of H5N1 Influenza Virus in Ferrets in the Context of Natural Exposure Routes.

Kathryn M Edenborough, Suzanne Lowther, Karen Laurie, Manabu Yamada, Fenella Long, John Bingham, Jean Payne, Jennifer Harper, Jessica Haining, Rachel Arkinstall and 3 more

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of virology, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
1.3field-weighted citation impact, top 18% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed, 18 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

13 authors at 4 institutions in 1 country.

Kathryn M EdenboroughDepartment of Microbiology and Immunology, The University of Melbourne at The Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, Melbourne, Australia.
Suzanne LowtherAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Karen LaurieDepartment of Microbiology and Immunology, The University of Melbourne at The Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, Melbourne, Australia WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza, Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, Melbourne, Australia.
Manabu YamadaAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Fenella LongAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
John BinghamAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Jean PayneAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Jennifer HarperAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Jessica HainingAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Rachel ArkinstallAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Brad GilbertsonDepartment of Microbiology and Immunology, The University of Melbourne at The Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, Melbourne, Australia.
Deborah MiddletonAustralian Animal Health Laboratory, CSIRO, East Geelong, Australia.
Lorena E BrownDepartment of Microbiology and Immunology, The University of Melbourne at The Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity, Melbourne, Australia lorena@unimelb.edu.au.
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation · AUAustralian Centre for Disease Preparedness · AUUniversity of Melbourne · AUPeter Doherty Institute · AU

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

unlabelledAlthough avian H5N1 influenza virus has yet to develop the capacity for human-to-human spread, the severity of the rare cases of human infection has warranted intensive follow-up of potentially exposed individuals that may require antiviral prophylaxis. For countries where antiviral drugs are limited, the World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a risk categorization for different levels of exposure to environmental, poultry, or human sources of infection. While these take into account the infection source, they do not account for the likely mode of virus entry that the individual may have experienced from that source and how this could affect the disease outcome. Knowledge of the kinetics and spread of virus after natural routes of exposure may further inform the risk of infection, as well as the likely disease severity. Using the ferret model of H5N1 infection, we compared the commonly used but artificial inoculation method that saturates the total respiratory tract (TRT) with virus to upper respiratory tract (URT) and oral routes of delivery, those likely to be encountered by humans in nature. We show that there was no statistically significant difference in survival rate with the different routes of infection, but the disease characteristics were somewhat different. Following URT infection, viral spread to systemic organs was comparatively delayed and more focal than after TRT infection. By both routes, severe disease was associated with early viremia and central nervous system infection. After oral exposure to the virus, mild infections were common suggesting consumption of virus-contaminated liquids may be associated with seroconversion in the absence of severe disease. IMPORTANCE: Risks for human H5N1 infection include direct contact with infected birds and frequenting contaminated environments. We used H5N1 ferret infection models to show that breathing in the virus was more likely to produce clinical infection than swallowing contaminated liquid. We also showed that virus could spread from the respiratory tract to the brain, which was associated with end-stage disease, and very early viremia provided a marker for this. With upper respiratory tract exposure, infection of the brain was common but hard to detect, suggesting that human neurological infections might be typically undetected at autopsy. However, viral spread to systemic sites was slower after exposure to virus by this route than when virus was additionally delivered to the lungs, providing a better therapeutic window. In addition to exposure history, early parameters of infection, such as viremia, could help prioritize antiviral treatments for patients most at risk of succumbing to infection.

Indexed as

Disease Models, AnimalDisease Transmission, InfectiousAnimalsFemaleFerretsInfluenza A Virus, H5N1 SubtypeMaleOrthomyxoviridae InfectionsRisk AssessmentSurvival Analysis

Identifiers

PMID26656692
PMCPMC4733973
OpenAlexW2332852666

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.