Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26573887›Full record

ArticleHealth services research2015

How Financial and Reputational Incentives Can Be Used to Improve Medical Care.

Martin Roland, R Adams Dudley

Registry-linked trialAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health services research, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. It is linked to trial NCT06829589 (Assessment of the Retrieval of Economic Incentives and Information Provision on Quality-of-care Indicators for Primary Care Professionals), which is not on this map. Cited by 30 papers, 4 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
30citing papers in PubMed, 4 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

NCT06829589 naactive not recruitingnot on this mapstarted 2025, after this paper: background citation

Assessment of the Retrieval of Economic Incentives and Information Provision on Quality-of-care Indicators for Primary Care Professionals

TypeinterventionalSponsorFundacio d'Investigacio en Atencio Primaria Jordi Gol i GurinaRan2025 to 2026Enrolled1,614ConditionsHypertension, Diabetes, Atrium, FibrillationArmsRemoval of economic incentives linked to 7 quality-of-care indicators, Removal of information provision linked to 7 quality-of-care indicators
3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

30 citing papers in PubMed, 4 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
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  4. Effectiveness of UK provider financial incentives on quality of care: a systematic review.The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners · 2017
    Pooled it
  5. Article
  6. Financial incentives and information provision for post-pandemic primary care quality recovery: a longitudinal study in Catalonia.The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners · 2026
    Article
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  13. Financing the "Village": Establishing a Sustainable Financial System for Child Behavioral Health.Child and adolescent psychiatric clinics of North America · 2024
    Review
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Martin RolandDepartment of Public Health and Primary Care, Institute of Public Health, University of Cambridge, Robinson Way, Cambridge CB2 0SR, UK.
R Adams DudleyCenter for Healthcare Value, Philip R. Lee Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California, San Francisco, San Francisco, CA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectivesNarrative review of the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) and public reporting (PR) on health care outcomes, including spillover effects and impact on disparities. PRINCIPAL

findingsThe impact of P4P and PR is dependent on the underlying payment system (fee-for-service, salary, capitation) into which these schemes are introduced. Both have the potential to improve care, but they can also have substantial unintended consequences. Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that individual physicians will vary in how they respond to incentives. We also discuss issues to be considered when including patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) or patient-reported experience measures into P4P and PR schemes.

conclusionWe provide guidance to payers and policy makers on the design of P4P and PR programs so as to maximize their benefits and minimize their unintended consequences. These include involving clinicians in the design of the program, taking into account the payment system into which new incentives are introduced, designing the structure of reward programs to maximize the likelihood of intended outcomes and minimize the likelihood of unintended consequences, designing schemes that minimize the risk of increasing disparities, providing stability of incentives over some years, and including outcomes that are relevant to patients' priorities. In addition, because of the limitations of PR and P4P as effective interventions in their own right, it is important that they are combined with other policies and interventions intended to improve quality to maximize their likely impact.

Indexed as

Quality Assurance, Health CareQuality ImprovementFee-for-Service PlansHealth Services ResearchHumansMotivationPhysiciansReimbursement, IncentiveSalaries and Fringe BenefitsIncentives in health carequality improvementquality of carereport cards

Identifiers

PMID26573887
PMCPMC5338201

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.