Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26559491›Full record

ArticleBMC research notes2015

Financial team incentives improved recording of diagnoses in primary care: a quasi-experimental longitudinal follow-up study with controls.

Tuomo Lehtovuori, Timo Kauppila, Jouko Kallio, Marko Raina, Lasse Suominen, Anna Maria Heikkinen

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC research notes, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 12 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
12citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

12 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Review
  3. Article
  4. Observational
  5. Article
  6. Observational
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Observational
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Observational
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Tuomo Lehtovuori, Espoo, Finland. tuomo.lehtovuori@espoo.fi.
Timo KauppilaDepartment of General Practice and Primary Healthcare, HUS, Institute of Clinical Medicine, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 20, Tukholmankatu 8 B, 00014, Vantaa, Finland. kauppila@helsinki.fi.
Jouko Kallio, Espoo, Finland. jouko.kallio@fimnet.fi.
Marko Raina, Vantaa, Finland. marko.raina@vantaa.fi.
Lasse Suominen, Espoo, Finland. lasse.suominen@espoo.fi.
Anna Maria HeikkinenDepartment of Oral and Maxillofacial Diseases, University of Helsinki, Espoo, Finland. amkheik@mappi.helsinki.fi.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundIn primary care, financial incentives have usually been directed to physicians because they are thought to make the key decisions in order to change the functions of a medical organization. There are no studies regarding the impact that directing these incentives to all disciplines of the care team (e.g. group bonuses for both nurses and doctors) may have, despite the low frequency with which diagnoses were being recorded for primary care visits to doctors. This study tested the effect of offering group bonuses to the care teams.

methodsThis was a retrospective quasi-experimental study with before-and-after settings and two control groups. In the intervention group, the mean percentage of visits to a doctor for which a diagnosis was recorded by each individual care team (mean team-based percentage of monthly visits to a doctor with recorded diagnoses) and simultaneously the same data was gathered from two different primary care settings where no team bonuses were applied. To study the sustainability of changes obtained with the group bonuses the respective data were derived from the electronic health record system for 2 years after the cessation of the intervention. The differences in the rate of marking diagnoses was analyzed with ANOVA and RM-ANOVA with appropriate post hoc tests, and the differences in the rate of change in marking diagnoses was analyzed with linear regression followed by t-test.

resultsThe proportion of doctor visits having recorded diagnoses in the teams was about 55 % before starting to use group bonuses and 90 % after this intervention. There was no such increase in control units. The effect of the intervention weakened slightly after cessation of the group bonuses.

conclusionGroup bonuses may provide a method to alter clinical practices in primary care. However, sustainability of these interventions may diminish after ceasing this type of financial incentive.

Indexed as

Analysis of VarianceCost ControlFollow-Up StudiesHumansOffice VisitsPatient Care TeamPhysician Incentive PlansPhysicians, Primary CarePrimary Health CareQuality of Health CareReimbursement, IncentiveRetrospective StudiesTime Factors

Identifiers

PMID26559491
PMCPMC4642783

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.