Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26522470›Full record

ArticleAmerican journal of human genetics2015

Privacy Risks from Genomic Data-Sharing Beacons.

Suyash S Shringarpure, Carlos D Bustamante

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in American journal of human genetics, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 95 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
95citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

95 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. The Portuguese Beacon: sharing genomic variant data safely.Database : the journal of biological databases and curation · 2026
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
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  15. Article
  16. Review
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies in Biomedical Data Science.Annual review of biomedical data science · 2024
    Review
  20. Article

35 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Suyash S ShringarpureDepartment of Genetics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. Electronic address: suyashs@stanford.edu.
Carlos D BustamanteDepartment of Genetics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. Electronic address: cdbustam@stanford.edu.

Funding

Clinically Relevant Genome Variation DatabaseU01HG007436 · NHGRI · STANFORD UNIVERSITY · PI BUSTAMANTE, CARLOS DANIEL, PLON, SHARON E. · 2013 to 2016
$10.5M
NHGRI NIH HHS U01 HG007436NHGRI NIH HHS U01HG007436
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The human genetics community needs robust protocols that enable secure sharing of genomic data from participants in genetic research. Beacons are web servers that answer allele-presence queries--such as "Do you have a genome that has a specific nucleotide (e.g., A) at a specific genomic position (e.g., position 11,272 on chromosome 1)?"--with either "yes" or "no." Here, we show that individuals in a beacon are susceptible to re-identification even if the only data shared include presence or absence information about alleles in a beacon. Specifically, we propose a likelihood-ratio test of whether a given individual is present in a given genetic beacon. Our test is not dependent on allele frequencies and is the most powerful test for a specified false-positive rate. Through simulations, we showed that in a beacon with 1,000 individuals, re-identification is possible with just 5,000 queries. Relatives can also be identified in the beacon. Re-identification is possible even in the presence of sequencing errors and variant-calling differences. In a beacon constructed with 65 European individuals from the 1000 Genomes Project, we demonstrated that it is possible to detect membership in the beacon with just 250 SNPs. With just 1,000 SNP queries, we were able to detect the presence of an individual genome from the Personal Genome Project in an existing beacon. Our results show that beacons can disclose membership and implied phenotypic information about participants and do not protect privacy a priori. We discuss risk mitigation through policies and standards such as not allowing anonymous pings of genetic beacons and requiring minimum beacon sizes.

Indexed as

Genetic PrivacyGenetic VariationGenome, HumanTask Performance and AnalysisHaplotypesHigh-Throughput Nucleotide SequencingHumansInformation Dissemination

Identifiers

PMID26522470
PMCPMC4667107

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.