Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26490628›Full record

ArticleJournal of the Royal Society, Interface2015

The cost of attack in competing networks.

B Podobnik, D Horvatic, T Lipic, M Perc, J M Buldú, H E Stanley

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of the Royal Society, Interface, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Biological conservation law as an emerging functionality in dynamical neuronal networks.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2017
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. System crash as dynamics of complex networks.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2016
    Article
  7. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

B PodobnikCenter for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA Faculty of Civil Engineering, University of Rijeka, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia Zagreb School of Economics and Management, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia.
D HorvaticFaculty of Natural Sciences, University of Zagreb, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia davorh@phy.hr.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0411-8474
T LipicCenter for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA Rudjer Boskovic Institute, Centre for Informatics and Computing, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8037-8198
M PercFaculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia Department of Physics, Faculty of Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3087-541X
J M BuldúCenter for Biomedical Technology (UPM), 28223 Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid, Spain Complex Systems Group, Rey Juan Carlos University, 28933 Móstoles, Madrid, Spain.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9345-599X
H E StanleyCenter for Polymer Studies and Department of Physics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2800-4495

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Real-world attacks can be interpreted as the result of competitive interactions between networks, ranging from predator-prey networks to networks of countries under economic sanctions. Although the purpose of an attack is to damage a target network, it also curtails the ability of the attacker, which must choose the duration and magnitude of an attack to avoid negative impacts on its own functioning. Nevertheless, despite the large number of studies on interconnected networks, the consequences of initiating an attack have never been studied. Here, we address this issue by introducing a model of network competition where a resilient network is willing to partially weaken its own resilience in order to more severely damage a less resilient competitor. The attacking network can take over the competitor's nodes after their long inactivity. However, owing to a feedback mechanism the takeovers weaken the resilience of the attacking network. We define a conservation law that relates the feedback mechanism to the resilience dynamics for two competing networks. Within this formalism, we determine the cost and optimal duration of an attack, allowing a network to evaluate the risk of initiating hostilities.

Indexed as

Models, EconomicWarfareHumansattackscomplex networksinteractive networksnetwork vulnerabilityrobustnesssocioeconomic systems

Identifiers

PMID26490628
PMCPMC4685846

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.