Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26473042›Full record

ArticleRoyal Society open science2015

Modelling the species jump: towards assessing the risk of human infection from novel avian influenzas.

A A Hill, T Dewé, R Kosmider, S Von Dobschuetz, O Munoz, A Hanna, A Fusaro, M De Nardi, W Howard, K Stevens and 3 more

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Royal Society open science, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
2.0field-weighted citation impact, top 13% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed, 13 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Converging and emerging threats to health security.Environment systems & decisions · 2018
    Review
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Urgent request on avian influenza.EFSA journal. European Food Safety Authority · 2017
    Article
  9. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

13 authors at 4 institutions in 2 countries.

A A HillRoyal Veterinary College , London, UK ; Animal and Plant Health Agency , New Haw, Surrey, UK.
T DewéAnimal and Plant Health Agency , New Haw, Surrey, UK.
R KosmiderAnimal and Plant Health Agency , New Haw, Surrey, UK.
S Von DobschuetzRoyal Veterinary College , London, UK ; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations , Rome, Italy.
O MunozInstituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venizie , Padua, Italy.
A HannaAnimal and Plant Health Agency , New Haw, Surrey, UK.
A FusaroInstituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venizie , Padua, Italy.
M De NardiInstituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venizie , Padua, Italy.
W HowardAnimal and Plant Health Agency , New Haw, Surrey, UK.
K StevensRoyal Veterinary College , London, UK.
L KellyAnimal and Plant Health Agency , New Haw, Surrey, UK.
A HavelaarRIVM, Bilthoven , The Netherlands.
K StärkRoyal Veterinary College , London, UK.
Animal and Plant Health Agency · GBIstituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie · ITRoyal Veterinary College · GBFood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations · IT

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The scientific understanding of the driving factors behind zoonotic and pandemic influenzas is hampered by complex interactions between viruses, animal hosts and humans. This complexity makes identifying influenza viruses of high zoonotic or pandemic risk, before they emerge from animal populations, extremely difficult and uncertain. As a first step towards assessing zoonotic risk of influenza, we demonstrate a risk assessment framework to assess the relative likelihood of influenza A viruses, circulating in animal populations, making the species jump into humans. The intention is that such a risk assessment framework could assist decision-makers to compare multiple influenza viruses for zoonotic potential and hence to develop appropriate strain-specific control measures. It also provides a first step towards showing proof of principle for an eventual pandemic risk model. We show that the spatial and temporal epidemiology is as important in assessing the risk of an influenza A species jump as understanding the innate molecular capability of the virus. We also demonstrate data deficiencies that need to be addressed in order to consistently combine both epidemiological and molecular virology data into a risk assessment framework.

Indexed as

avian influenzarisk assessmentzoonoses

Identifiers

PMID26473042
PMCPMC4593676
OpenAlexW2173765795

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.