Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26466787›Full record

ArticleBMC medical informatics and decision making2015

Patient and public views about the security and privacy of Electronic Health Records (EHRs) in the UK: results from a mixed methods study.

Chrysanthi Papoutsi, Julie E Reed, Cicely Marston, Ruth Lewis, Azeem Majeed, Derek Bell

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC medical informatics and decision making, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 48 papers, 3 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
48citing papers in PubMed, 3 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

48 citing papers in PubMed, 3 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Chrysanthi PapoutsiNIHR CLAHRC Northwest London, Imperial College London, Chelsea & Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK.
Julie E ReedNIHR CLAHRC Northwest London, Imperial College London, Chelsea & Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK.
Cicely MarstonDepartment of Social and Environmental Health Research, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
Ruth LewisDepartment of Social and Environmental Health Research, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
Azeem MajeedDepartment of Primary Care & Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK.
Derek BellNIHR CLAHRC Northwest London, Imperial College London, Chelsea & Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, London, UK. d.bell@imperial.ac.uk.

Funding

Wellcome Trust 086124/Z/08/Z
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundAlthough policy discourses frame integrated Electronic Health Records (EHRs) as essential for contemporary healthcare systems, increased information sharing often raises concerns among patients and the public. This paper examines patient and public views about the security and privacy of EHRs used for health provision, research and policy in the UK.

methodsSequential mixed methods study with a cross-sectional survey (in 2011) followed by focus group discussions (in 2012-2013). Survey participants (N = 5331) were recruited from primary and secondary care settings in West London (UK). Complete data for 2761 (51.8 %) participants were included in the final analysis for this paper. The survey results were discussed in 13 focus groups with people living with a range of different health conditions, and in 4 mixed focus groups with patients, health professionals and researchers (total N = 120). Qualitative data were analysed thematically.

resultsIn the survey, 79 % of participants reported that they would worry about the security of their record if this was part of a national EHR system and 71 % thought the National Health Service (NHS) was unable to guarantee EHR safety at the time this work was carried out. Almost half (47 %) responded that EHRs would be less secure compared with the way their health record was held at the time of the survey. Of those who reported being worried about EHR security, many would nevertheless support their development (55 %), while 12 % would not support national EHRs and a sizeable proportion (33 %) were undecided. There were also variations by age, ethnicity and education. In focus group discussions participants weighed up perceived benefits against potential security and privacy threats from wider sharing of information, as well as discussing other perceived risks: commercial exploitation, lack of accountability, data inaccuracies, prejudice and inequalities in health provision.

conclusionsPatient and public worries about the security risks associated with integrated EHRs highlight the need for intensive public awareness and engagement initiatives, together with the establishment of trustworthy security and privacy mechanisms for health information sharing.

Indexed as

PrivacyAdultAgedComputer SecurityElectronic Health RecordsFemaleHealth Care SurveysHumansLondonMaleMiddle AgedNational Health ProgramsQualitative ResearchYoung Adult

Identifiers

PMID26466787
PMCPMC4607170

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.