ArticleJournal of the Royal Society, Interface2015
Structural symmetry in evolutionary games.
Article in Journal of the Royal Society, Interface, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.
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Who cites it
7 citing papers in PubMed, 24 citations in OpenAlex.
- An evolutionary differential game for regulating the role of monoclonal antibodies in treating signalling pathways in oesophageal cancer.Royal Society open science · 2024Article
- Symmetry in models of natural selection.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2023Article
- Fixation properties of multiple cooperator configurations on regular graphs.Theory in biosciences = Theorie in den Biowissenschaften · 2019Article
- Environmental fitness heterogeneity in the Moran process.Royal Society open science · 2019Article
- Optimizing Cancer Treatment Using Game Theory: A Review.JAMA oncology · 2019Review
- Fixation Probabilities for Any Configuration of Two Strategies on Regular Graphs.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- Evolutionary Games of Multiplayer Cooperation on Graphs.PLoS computational biology · 2016Article
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Authors and funding
2 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a randomly occurring mutant will fixate in the population. However, in a structured population, this fixation probability may depend on where the mutant arises. Moreover, the fixation probability is just one quantity by which one can measure the success of a mutant; fixation time, for instance, is another. We define a notion of homogeneity for evolutionary games that captures what it means for two single-mutant states, i.e. two configurations of a single mutant in an otherwise-monomorphic population, to be 'evolutionarily equivalent' in the sense that all measures of evolutionary success are the same for both configurations. Using asymmetric games, we argue that the term 'homogeneous' should apply to the evolutionary process as a whole rather than to just the population structure. For evolutionary matrix games in graph-structured populations, we give precise conditions under which the resulting process is homogeneous. Finally, we show that asymmetric matrix games can be reduced to symmetric games if the population structure possesses a sufficient degree of symmetry.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.