Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26404673›Full record

ArticleBMC medicine2015

Unaddressed privacy risks in accredited health and wellness apps: a cross-sectional systematic assessment.

Kit Huckvale, José Tomás Prieto, Myra Tilney, Pierre-Jean Benghozi, Josip Car

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC medicine, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 148 papers, 9 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
148citing papers in PubMed, 9 pooled it
81.1field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

148 citing papers in PubMed, 9 syntheses or guidelines pooled it, 400 citations in OpenAlex.

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  20. Quality assessment of mHealth apps: a scoping review.Frontiers in health services · 2024
    Article

88 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 4 institutions in 3 countries.

Kit HuckvaleGlobal eHealth Unit, Imperial College London, Reynolds Building, St Dunstan's Road, London, W6 8RP, UK. c.huckvale@imperial.ac.uk.
José Tomás PrietoCRG, Ecole polytechnique CNRS, Bâtiment Ensta, 828 boulevard des Maréchaux, Palaiseau, Cedex, 91762, France. jose-tomas.prieto@polytechnique.edu.
Myra TilneyGlobal eHealth Unit, Imperial College London, Reynolds Building, St Dunstan's Road, London, W6 8RP, UK. m.tilney11@imperial.ac.uk.
Pierre-Jean BenghoziCRG, Ecole polytechnique CNRS, Bâtiment Ensta, 828 boulevard des Maréchaux, Palaiseau, Cedex, 91762, France. pierre-jean.benghozi@arcep.fr.
Josip CarGlobal eHealth Unit, Imperial College London, Reynolds Building, St Dunstan's Road, London, W6 8RP, UK. josip.car@imperial.ac.uk.
Imperial College London · GBCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique · FRÉcole Polytechnique · FRNanyang Technological University · SG

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundPoor information privacy practices have been identified in health apps. Medical app accreditation programs offer a mechanism for assuring the quality of apps; however, little is known about their ability to control information privacy risks. We aimed to assess the extent to which already-certified apps complied with data protection principles mandated by the largest national accreditation program.

methodsCross-sectional, systematic, 6-month assessment of 79 apps certified as clinically safe and trustworthy by the UK NHS Health Apps Library. Protocol-based testing was used to characterize personal information collection, local-device storage and information transmission. Observed information handling practices were compared against privacy policy commitments.

resultsThe study revealed that 89% (n = 70/79) of apps transmitted information to online services. No app encrypted personal information stored locally. Furthermore, 66% (23/35) of apps sending identifying information over the Internet did not use encryption and 20% (7/35) did not have a privacy policy. Overall, 67% (53/79) of apps had some form of privacy policy. No app collected or transmitted information that a policy explicitly stated it would not; however, 78% (38/49) of information-transmitting apps with a policy did not describe the nature of personal information included in transmissions. Four apps sent both identifying and health information without encryption. Although the study was not designed to examine data handling after transmission to online services, security problems appeared to place users at risk of data theft in two cases.

conclusionsSystematic gaps in compliance with data protection principles in accredited health apps question whether certification programs relying substantially on developer disclosures can provide a trusted resource for patients and clinicians. Accreditation programs should, as a minimum, provide consistent and reliable warnings about possible threats and, ideally, require publishers to rectify vulnerabilities before apps are released.

Indexed as

ConfidentialitySoftwareComputer SecurityCross-Sectional StudiesHumansInternetNational Health ProgramsRisk AssessmentUnited Kingdom

Identifiers

PMID26404673
PMCPMC4582624
OpenAlexW2120522957

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.