ArticleProceedings. Biological sciences2015
Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.
Article in Proceedings. Biological sciences, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 27 papers.
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Who cites it
27 citing papers in PubMed.
- The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Promoting Low-Carbon Purchase from Social Norms Perspective.Behavioral sciences (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023Article
- Self-serving reward and punishment: evidence from the laboratory.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding.Nature communications · 2022Article
- Institutional incentives for the evolution of committed cooperation: ensuring participation is as important as enhancing compliance.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2022Article
- Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Evolution of cooperation in costly institutions exhibits Red Queen and Black Queen dynamics in heterogeneous public goods.Communications biology · 2021Article
- Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Article
- Freedom to choose between public resources promotes cooperation.PLoS computational biology · 2021Article
- Cooperation in an Assortative Matching Prisoners Dilemma Experiment with Pro-Social Dummies.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2019Article
- Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- The competitive advantage of institutional reward.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2019Article
- Knowing the past improves cooperation in the future.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- An optimal strategy to solve the Prisoner's Dilemma.Scientific reports · 2018Article
- Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation.PloS one · 2018Article
- Coevolution of Vertex Weights Resolves Social Dilemma in Spatial Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Risk-aware multi-armed bandit problem with application to portfolio selection.Royal Society open science · 2017Article
- Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.Scientific reports · 2017Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players. However, strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly common, not just in human societies, but also among eusocial insects and bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially, or rewarding of free-riders who do not contribute to collective enterprises. We therefore study the public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the effectiveness of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a naive expectation, we show that the ability of defectors to distribute rewards to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able to do the same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding, the spatial selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas is enhanced. Since the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors when aggregated, on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent inability to secure a sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour, thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.
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