Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26339123›Full record

ArticleGames and economic behavior2015

Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.

Christian Hilbe, Arne Traulsen, Karl Sigmund

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Games and economic behavior, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 37 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
37citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

37 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  5. Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Conditional cooperation with longer memory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  8. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Christian HilbeProgram for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States.
Arne TraulsenDepartment of Evolutionary Theory, Max-Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany.
Karl SigmundFaculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Vienna, Austria ; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria.

Funding

Austrian Science Fund FWF J 3475
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players' payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.

Indexed as

CooperationExtortionReciprocityRepeated gamesZero-determinant strategies

Identifiers

PMID26339123
PMCPMC4547490

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.