Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26320212›Full record

ArticleJournal of medical ethics2015

The ethics of biosafety considerations in gain-of-function research resulting in the creation of potential pandemic pathogens.

Nicholas Greig Evans, Marc Lipsitch, Meira Levinson

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of medical ethics, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 19 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
19citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

19 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Principal Investigator Responsibility for Flagging Research with Dual-Use or Pandemic Risk.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2025
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics.Monash bioethics review · 2024
    Review
  6. Public role in research oversight.Journal of virology · 2024
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Socially responsible science: Exploring the complexities.European journal for philosophy of science · 2023
    Article
  9. Review
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Review
  13. Opinion: Risk to study nonparticipants: A procedural approach.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2018
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Why Do Exceptionally Dangerous Gain-of-Function Experiments in Influenza?Methods in molecular biology (Clifton, N.J.) · 2018
    Review
  17. Review
  18. Gain-of-Function Research: Ethical Analysis.Science and engineering ethics · 2016
    Article
  19. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Nicholas Greig EvansDepartment of Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.
Marc LipsitchCenter for Communicable Disease Dynamics, Department of Epidemiology, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts, USA.
Meira LevinsonGraduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA.

Funding

Understanding and controlling antibiotic resistanceU54GM088558 · NIGMS · HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH · PI HANAGE, WILLIAM · 2009 to 2018
$26.4M
NIGMS NIH HHS U54 GM088558NIGMS NIH HHS U54GM088558
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper proposes an ethical framework for evaluating biosafety risks of gain-of-function (GOF) experiments that create novel strains of influenza expected to be virulent and transmissible in humans, so-called potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs). Such research raises ethical concerns because of the risk that accidental release from a laboratory could lead to extensive or even global spread of a virulent pathogen. Biomedical research ethics has focused largely on human subjects research, while biosafety concerns about accidental infections, seen largely as a problem of occupational health, have been ignored. GOF/PPP research is an example of a small but important class of research where biosafety risks threaten public health, well beyond the small number of persons conducting the research.We argue that bioethical principles that ordinarily apply only to human subjects research should also apply to research that threatens public health, even if, as in GOF/PPP studies, the research involves no human subjects. Specifically we highlight the Nuremberg Code's requirements of 'fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods', and proportionality of risk and humanitarian benefit, as broad ethical principles that recur in later documents on research ethics and should also apply to certain types of research not involving human subjects. We address several potential objections to this view, and conclude with recommendations for bringing these ethical considerations into policy development.

Indexed as

Biological Science DisciplinesMoral ObligationsPandemicsBiomedical ResearchEthics, ResearchHuman ExperimentationHumansInfluenza A Virus, H1N1 SubtypeInfluenza A Virus, H5N1 SubtypeInfluenza, HumanInternational CooperationPolicy MakingPublic HealthResearch SubjectsHistory of Health Ethics/BioethicsPhilosophical EthicsResearch Ethics

Identifiers

PMID26320212
PMCPMC4623968

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.