Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26173765›Full record

SynthesisAddiction (Abingdon, England)2016

How does the alcohol industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review.

Emily Savell, Gary Fooks, Anna B Gilmore

Abstract readSystematic Review
In one paragraph

Synthesis in Addiction (Abingdon, England), 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 109 papers, 5 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
109citing papers in PubMed, 5 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

109 citing papers in PubMed, 5 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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  16. Public health policies to prevent alcohol-related liver disease.Nature reviews. Gastroenterology & hepatology · 2025
    Review
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  19. Review
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49 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Emily SavellDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, UK.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2174-6413
Gary FooksSchool of Languages and Social Science, Aston University, Birmingham, UK.
Anna B GilmoreDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, UK.

Funding

Tobacco Companies, Global Governance and Public HealthR01CA160695 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF BATH · PI GILMORE, ANNA B · 2011 to 2013
$1.3M
Medical Research Council MR/K023195/1NCI NIH HHS R01 CA160695
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

aimTo systematically review, using a qualitative, narrative synthesis approach, papers examining alcohol industry efforts to influence alcohol marketing policy, and compare with those used by the tobacco industry.

methodsLiterature searches were conducted between April and July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Papers were included if they: made reference to alcohol industry efforts to influence (a) policy debates concerning marketing regulations, (b) new specific marketing policies or (c) broad alcohol policy which included marketing regulations; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990-2013. Alcohol industry political activity was categorized into strategies/tactics and frames/arguments. Data extraction was undertaken by the lead author and 100% of the papers were fully second-reviewed. Seventeen papers met the review criteria.

resultsFive main political strategies and five main frames were identified. The alcohol industry argues against marketing regulation by emphasizing industry responsibility and the effectiveness of self-regulation, questioning the effectiveness of statutory regulation and by focusing on individual responsibility. Arguments relating to industry responsibility are often reinforced through corporate social responsibility activities. The industry primarily conveys its arguments through manipulating the evidence base and by promoting ineffective voluntary codes and non-regulatory initiatives.

conclusionsThe alcohol industry's political activity is more varied than existing models of corporate political activity suggest. The industry's opposition to marketing regulation centres on claims that the industry is responsible and that self regulation is effective. There are considerable commonalities between tobacco and alcohol industry political activity, with differences due potentially to differences in policy contexts and perceived industry legitimacy.

Indexed as

Alcoholic BeveragesPoliticsHumansIndustryMarketingPublic PolicyAlcohol industrycorporate policy influencecorporate political activityframingmarketing policymarketing regulationsystematic reviewtobacco industry

Identifiers

PMID26173765
PMCPMC4681589

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.