Evidence map›Paper›PMID 26150518›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2015

Stochastic game dynamics under demographic fluctuations.

Weini Huang, Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen

Erratum issuedAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 31 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
31citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

31 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Modeling combination chemo-immunotherapy for heterogeneous tumors.Quantitative biology (Beijing, China) · 2025
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  5. Deterministic theory of evolutionary games on temporal networks.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024
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  10. Reproductive variance can drive behavioral dynamics.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Weini HuangDepartment of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany;
Christoph HauertDepartment of Mathematics, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1239-281X
Arne TraulsenDepartment of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany; traulsen@evolbio.mpg.de.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Frequency-dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency-dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on interactions between individuals within the population. This should be reflected in fluctuations of the population size even in constant environments. Here, we propose a stochastic model that naturally combines these two evolutionary ingredients by assuming frequency-dependent competition between different types in an individual-based model. In contrast to previous game theoretic models, the carrying capacity of the population, and thus the population size, is determined by pairwise competition of individuals mediated by evolutionary games and demographic stochasticity. In the limit of infinite population size, the averaged stochastic dynamics is captured by deterministic competitive Lotka-Volterra equations. In small populations, demographic stochasticity may instead lead to the extinction of the entire population. Because the population size is driven by fitness in evolutionary games, a population of cooperators is less prone to go extinct than a population of defectors, whereas in the usual systems of fixed size the population would thrive regardless of its average payoff.

Indexed as

DemographyGame TheoryExtinction, BiologicalHumansModels, TheoreticalPopulation DensityPopulation DynamicsStochastic Processeschanging population sizeevolutionary gamesstochastic dynamics

Identifiers

PMID26150518
PMCPMC4517200

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.