ArticleScientific reports2015
A double-edged sword: Benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games.
Article in Scientific reports, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.
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15 citing papers in PubMed.
- Criminal organizations exhibit hysteresis, resilience, and robustness by balancing security and efficiency.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- The probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff outperforms previous pool and peer punishment.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Environmental Governance Cooperative Behavior among Enterprises with Reputation Effect Based on Complex Networks Evolutionary Game Model.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2020Article
- Wealth-relative effects in cooperation games.Heliyon · 2019Article
- Evolutionary dynamics of organised crime and terrorist networks.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- Environment-based preference selection promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Scientific reports · 2018Article
- Inequality as information: Wealth homophily facilitates the evolution of cooperation.Scientific reports · 2018Article
- Strategy intervention for the evolution of fairness.PloS one · 2018Article
- Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Individual mobility promotes punishment in evolutionary public goods games.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Modelling the role of correctional services on gangs: insights through a mathematical model.Royal Society open science · 2017Article
- A remarkable effect of the combination of probabilistic peer-punishment and coevolutionary mechanism on the evolution of cooperation.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Evolution of cooperation by the introduction of the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff.Scientific reports · 2016Article
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2 authors.
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Abstract
As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails ordinary people who neither commit nor sanction crime as the third strategy besides the criminals and punishers. Since ordinary people free-ride on the sanctioning efforts of punishers, they may introduce cyclic dominance that enables the coexistence of all three competing strategies. In this setup ordinary individuals become the biggest impediment to crime abatement. We therefore also consider heterogeneous punisher strategies, which seek to reduce their investment into fighting crime in order to attain a more competitive payoff. We show that this diversity of punishment leads to an explosion of complexity in the system, where the benefits and pitfalls of criminal behavior are revealed in the most unexpected ways. Due to the raise and fall of different alliances no less than six consecutive phase transitions occur in dependence on solely the temptation to succumb to criminal behavior, leading the population from ordinary people-dominated across punisher-dominated to crime-dominated phases, yet always failing to abolish crime completely.
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