Evidence map›Paper›PMID 25964401›Full record

ArticleAnnals of family medicine

Working under a clinic-level quality incentive: primary care clinicians' perceptions.

Jessica Greene, Ellen T Kurtzman, Judith H Hibbard, Valerie Overton

Open access · diamondAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Annals of family medicine. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
3.7field-weighted citation impact, top 7% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 12 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. In This Issue: A Cry for Balance.Annals of family medicine
    Article
  7. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Jessica GreeneSchool of Nursing, The George Washington University, Washington, DC jessgreene@gwu.edu.
Ellen T KurtzmanSchool of Nursing, The George Washington University, Washington, DC.
Judith H HibbardDepartment of Planning, Public Policy, and Management, Health Policy Research Group, University of Oregon.
Valerie OvertonVice President Quality and Innovation, Fairview Medical Group.
George Washington University · USUniversity of Oregon · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundA key consideration in designing pay-for-performance programs is determining what entity the incentive should be awarded to-individual clinicians or to groups of clinicians working in teams. Some argue that team-level incentives, in which clinicians who are part of a team receive the same incentive based on the team's performance, are most effective; others argue for the efficacy of clinician-level incentives. This study examines primary care clinicians' perceptions of a team-based quality incentive awarded at the clinic level.

methodsThis research was conducted with Fairview Health Services, where 40% of the primary care compensation model was based on clinic-level quality performance. We conducted 48 in-depth interviews to explore clinicians' perceptions of the clinic-level incentive, as well as an online survey of 150 clinicians (response rate 56%) to investigate which entity the clinicians would consider optimal to target for quality incentives.

resultsClinicians reported the strengths of the clinic-based quality incentive were quality improvement for the team and less patient "dumping," or shifting patients with poor outcomes to other clinicians. The weaknesses were clinicians' lack of control and colleagues riding the coattails of higher performers. There were mixed reports on the model's impact on team dynamics. Although clinicians reported greater interaction with colleagues, some described an increase in tension. Most clinicians surveyed (73%) believed that there should be a mix of clinic and individual-level incentives to maintain collaboration and recognize individual performance.

conclusionThe study highlights the important advantages and disadvantages of using incentives based upon clinic-level performance. Future research should test whether hybrid incentives that mix group and individual incentives can maintain some of the best elements of each design while mitigating the negative impacts.

Indexed as

AdultFemaleHealth PersonnelHumansMaleMiddle AgedMinnesotaPerceptionPhysician Incentive PlansPrimary Health CareQuality ImprovementReimbursement, IncentiveSurveys and Questionnairesphysician incentive plansquality improvement

Identifiers

PMID25964401
PMCPMC4427418
OpenAlexW1897215362

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.