ArticleJournal of theoretical biology2015
Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.
Article in Journal of theoretical biology, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.
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Who cites it
15 citing papers in PubMed.
- Payoff landscapes and the robustness of selfish optimization in iterated games.Journal of mathematical biology · 2022Article
- Mitigation of block withholding attack based on zero-determinant strategy.PeerJ. Computer science · 2022Article
- Strategically influencing an uncertain future.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- The evolution of universal adaptations of life is driven by universal properties of matter: energy, entropy, and interaction.F1000Research · 2020Article
- An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Approach for Assessing Privacy Protection in mHealth Systems.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2018Article
- Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2018Article
- Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2016Article
- Small groups and long memories promote cooperation.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- Autocratic strategies for iterated games with arbitrary action spaces.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2016Article
- Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion.Nature communications · 2016Article
- Updating Darwin: Information and entropy drive the evolution of life.F1000Research · 2016Article
- Asymmetric Power Boosts Extortion in an Economic Experiment.PloS one · 2016Article
- Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game.Scientific reports · 2015Article
- Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas.PloS one · 2015Article
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4 authors.
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Abstract
Repetition is one of the key mechanisms to maintain cooperation. In long-term relationships, in which individuals can react to their peers׳ past actions, evolution can promote cooperative strategies that would not be stable in one-shot encounters. The iterated prisoner׳s dilemma illustrates the power of repetition. Many of the key strategies for this game, such as ALLD, ALLC, Tit-for-Tat, or generous Tit-for-Tat, share a common property: players using these strategies enforce a linear relationship between their own payoff and their co-player׳s payoff. Such strategies have been termed zero-determinant (ZD). Recently, it was shown that ZD strategies also exist for multiplayer social dilemmas, and here we explore their evolutionary performance. For small group sizes, ZD strategies play a similar role as for the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma: extortionate ZD strategies are critical for the emergence of cooperation, whereas generous ZD strategies are important to maintain cooperation. In large groups, however, generous strategies tend to become unstable and selfish behaviors gain the upper hand. Our results suggest that repeated interactions alone are not sufficient to maintain large-scale cooperation. Instead, large groups require further mechanisms to sustain cooperation, such as the formation of alliances or institutions, or additional pairwise interactions between group members.
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