Evidence map›Paper›PMID 25798021›Full record

ArticleBiology & philosophy

Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal consciousness.

Brian Key

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Biology & philosophy. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Review
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Designing Brains for Pain: Human to Mollusc.Frontiers in physiology · 2018
    Article
  11. Reply to Adamo, Key et al., and Schilling and Cruse: Crawling around the hard problem of consciousness.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2016
    Article
  12. Insects cannot tell us anything about subjective experience or the origin of consciousness.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2016
    Article
  13. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Brian KeySchool of Biomedical Sciences, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 4072 Australia.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Phenomenal consciousness or the subjective experience of feeling sensory stimuli is fundamental to human existence. Because of the ubiquity of their subjective experiences, humans seem to readily accept the anthropomorphic extension of these mental states to other animals. Humans will typically extrapolate feelings of pain to animals if they respond physiologically and behaviourally to noxious stimuli. The alternative view that fish instead respond to noxious stimuli reflexly and with a limited behavioural repertoire is defended within the context of our current understanding of the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of mental states. Consequently, a set of fundamental properties of neural tissue necessary for feeling pain or experiencing affective states in vertebrates is proposed. While mammals and birds possess the prerequisite neural architecture for phenomenal consciousness, it is concluded that fish lack these essential characteristics and hence do not feel pain.

Indexed as

Affective statesAvoidance learningFishNeocortexPainPalliumPhenomenal consciousness

Identifiers

PMID25798021
PMCPMC4356734

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.