ArticleScientific reports2015
Spatial evolutionary public goods game on complete graph and dense complex networks.
Article in Scientific reports, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
3 citing papers in PubMed, 17 citations in OpenAlex.
- Motivating data contributions via a distinct career currency.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Research on an evolutionary game model and simulation of a cluster innovation network based on fairness preference.PloS one · 2020Article
- Reciprocity in spatial evolutionary public goods game on double-layered network.Scientific reports · 2016Article
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Authors and funding
4 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.
Funding
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Abstract
We study the spatial evolutionary public goods game (SEPGG) with voluntary or optional participation on a complete graph (CG) and on dense networks. Based on analyses of the SEPGG rate equation on finite CG, we find that SEPGG has two stable states depending on the value of multiplication factor r, illustrating how the "tragedy of the commons" and "an anomalous state without any active participants" occurs in real-life situations. When r is low (<<), the state with only loners is stable, and the state with only defectors is stable when r is high (>>). We also derive the exact scaling relation for r*. All of the results are confirmed by numerical simulation. Furthermore, we find that a cooperator-dominant state emerges when the number of participants or the mean degree, 〈k〉, decreases. We also investigate the scaling dependence of the emergence of cooperation on r and 〈k〉. These results show how "tragedy of the commons" disappears when cooperation between egoistic individuals without any additional socioeconomic punishment increases.
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