ArticleScientific reports2015
Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations.
Article in Scientific reports, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 18 papers.
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Who cites it
18 citing papers in PubMed.
- A new electoral bottom-up model of institutional governance.Scientific reports · 2025Article
- The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs.Nature communications · 2024Article
- The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional division of labour on a tree network.Royal Society open science · 2023Article
- Promoting Low-Carbon Purchase from Social Norms Perspective.Behavioral sciences (Basel, Switzerland) · 2023Article
- The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional linear division of labour of finite roles.Royal Society open science · 2023Article
- The coordination of collective and individual solutions in risk-resistant scenarios.The European physical journal. B · 2023Article
- Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2022Article
- Evolution of prosocial punishment in unstructured and structured populations and in the presence of antisocial punishment.PloS one · 2021Article
- Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- Co-Evolution of Complex Network Public Goods Game under the Edges Rules.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2020Article
- Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2019Article
- Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- The competitive advantage of institutional reward.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2019Article
- Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives.Scientific reports · 2016Article
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3 authors.
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Abstract
Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other's efforts to maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustainable by punishing the second-order free riders. This suggests that considering the interdependence of reward and punishment may help to better understand the origins and transitions of social norms and institutions.
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