Evidence map›Paper›PMID 25726716›Full record

ArticleMathematical biosciences2015

Antibiotic resistance as collateral damage: the tragedy of the commons in a two-disease setting.

Daozhou Gao, Thomas M Lietman, Travis C Porco

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Mathematical biosciences, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Ethics and antibiotic resistance.British medical bulletin · 2022
    Article
  4. Dynamical Modeling as a Tool for Inferring Causation.American journal of epidemiology · 2022
    Article
  5. Trends in mathematical modeling of host-pathogen interactions.Cellular and molecular life sciences : CMLS · 2020
    Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Review
  9. Coinfection Dynamics of Two Diseases in a Single Host Population.Journal of mathematical analysis and applications · 2016
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Daozhou GaoFrancis I. Proctor Foundation for Research in Ophthalmology, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA. Electronic address: daozhou.gao@ucsf.edu.
Thomas M LietmanFrancis I. Proctor Foundation for Research in Ophthalmology, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA; Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA; Department of Ophthalmology, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Travis C PorcoFrancis I. Proctor Foundation for Research in Ophthalmology, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA; Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA; Department of Ophthalmology, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA. Electronic address: travis.porco@ucsf.edu.

Funding

TANA IIU10EY016214 · NEI · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI LIETMAN, THOMAS M · 2004 to 2013
$4.4M
"Modeling contact investigation and rapid response"U01GM087728 · NIGMS · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI PORCO, TRAVIS CHRISTIAN · 2011 to 2015
$2.2M
NEI NIH HHS U10 EY016214NEI NIH HHS U10EY016214NIGMS NIH HHS U01 GM087728NIGMS NIH HHS U01GM087728
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We propose a simple two-disease epidemic model where one disease exhibits only a drug-sensitive strain, while the other exhibits both drug-sensitive and drug-resistant strains. Treatment for the first disease may select for resistance in the other. We model antibiotic use as a mathematical game through the study of individual incentives and community welfare. The basic reproduction number is derived and the existence and local stability of the model equilibria are analyzed. When the force of infection of each disease is unaffected by the presence of the other, we find that there is a conflict of interest between individual and community, known as a tragedy of the commons, under targeted treatment toward persons infected by the single strain disease, but there is no conflict under mass treatment. However, we numerically show that individual and social incentive to use antibiotics may show disaccord under mass treatment if the restriction on the transmission ability of the dually infected people is removed, or drug resistant infection is worse than drug sensitive infection, or the uninfected state has a comparative disutility over the infected states.

Indexed as

Drug Resistance, MicrobialGame TheoryModels, TheoreticalCommunicable DiseasesHumansDrug-resistanceGame theoryMass treatmentTargeted treatmentTragedy of the commonsTwo diseases

Identifiers

PMID25726716
PMCPMC4414057

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.