Evidence map›Paper›PMID 25713313›Full record

ArticleTobacco control2016

The revision of the 2014 European tobacco products directive: an analysis of the tobacco industry's attempts to 'break the health silo'.

Silvy Peeters, Hélia Costa, David Stuckler, Martin McKee, Anna B Gilmore

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Tobacco control, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 33 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
33citing papers in PubMed
16.5field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

33 citing papers in PubMed, 65 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. The path to a European Health Union.The Lancet regional health. Europe · 2024
    Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Review
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Silvy PeetersDepartment for Health, University of Bath, and member of the UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies (UKCTAS), UK.
Hélia CostaDepartment of Sociology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
David StucklerDepartment of Sociology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Department of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
Martin McKeeDepartment of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK.
Anna B GilmoreDepartment for Health, University of Bath, and member of the UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies (UKCTAS), UK.
University of Bath · GBUniversity of Oxford · GBLondon School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine · GB

Funding

Tobacco Companies, Global Governance and Public HealthR01CA160695 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF BATH · PI GILMORE, ANNA B · 2011 to 2013
$1.3M
Medical Research Council MR/K023195/1NCI NIH HHS R01 CA160695NCI NIH HHS R01CA160695Wellcome Trust 100709
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe 2014 European Union (EU) Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) was negotiated in a changed policy context, following adoption of the EU's 'Smart Regulation' agenda, which transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) anticipated would increase their influence on health policy, and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which sought to reduce it. This study aims to explore the scale and nature of the TTCs' lobby against the EU TPD and evaluate how these developments have affected their ability to exert influence.

methodsAnalysis of 581 documents obtained through freedom of information requests, 28 leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents, 17 TTC documents from the Legacy Library, web content via Google alerts and searches of the EU institutions' websites, plus four stakeholder interviews.

resultsThe lobby was massive. PMI alone employed over 160 lobbyists. Strategies mainly used third parties. Efforts to 'Push' (amend) or 'Delay' the proposal and block 'extreme policy options' were partially successful, with plain packaging and point of sales display ban removed during the 3-year delay in the Commission. The Smart Regulation mechanism contributed to changes and delays, facilitating meetings between TTC representatives (including ex-Commission employees) and senior Commission staff. Contrary to Article 5.3, these meetings were not disclosed.

conclusionsDuring the legislative process, Article 5.3 was not consistently applied by non-health Directorates of the European Commission, while the tools of the Smart Regulation appear to have facilitated TTC access to, and influence on, the 2014 TPD. The use of third parties undermines Article 5.3.

Indexed as

Tobacco IndustryTobacco ProductsEuropePublic PolicyReferral and ConsultationPublic policyTobacco industryTobacco industry documents

Identifiers

PMID25713313
PMCPMC4669229
OpenAlexW2126893338

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.