Evidence map›Paper›PMID 25540242›Full record

ArticleJournal of the Royal Society, Interface2015

Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas.

Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of the Royal Society, Interface, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 36 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
36citing papers in PubMed
65.8field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

36 citing papers in PubMed, 250 citations in OpenAlex.

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  9. Oxytocin and the Punitive Hub-Dynamic Spread of Cooperation in Human Social Networks.The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience · 2022
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 2 institutions in 3 countries.

Attila SzolnokiInstitute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, PO Box 49, 1525 Budapest, Hungary szolnoki@mfa.kfki.hu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0907-0406
Matjaž PercFaculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia CAMTP-Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Krekova 2, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia matjaz.perc@uni-mb.si.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3087-541X
Hungarian Academy of Sciences · HUKing Abdulaziz University · SA

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behaviour in humans and social animals also compel to conformity in their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction of conformists within the population introduces an effective surface tension around cooperative clusters and ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy domains. Payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in favour of cooperation and enable an expansion of clusters past the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity. This mechanism works even under the most testing conditions, and it is robust against variations of the interaction network as long as degree-normalized payoffs are applied. Conformity may thus be beneficial for the resolution of social dilemmas.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorModels, TheoreticalSocial SupportAnimalsHumansconformitycooperationevolutionary gamesnetwork reciprocitysocial dilemmas

Identifiers

PMID25540242
PMCPMC4305429
OpenAlexW1980054933

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.