ArticleProceedings. Biological sciences2015
The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.
Article in Proceedings. Biological sciences, 2015. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 12 papers.
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Who cites it
12 citing papers in PubMed.
- The impact of heterogeneous interpersonal relationships on promoting cooperation under the reputation mechanisms in public goods game.PloS one · 2025Article
- Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding.Nature communications · 2022Article
- Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Article
- Evolution of coordinated punishment to enforce cooperation from an unbiased strategy space.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2019Article
- Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2019Article
- Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- The competitive advantage of institutional reward.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2019Article
- Pleiotropy, cooperation, and the social evolution of genetic architecture.PLoS biology · 2018Article
- Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite populations.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2015Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
1 author.
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Abstract
Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.