ArticlePloS one2014
Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.
Article in PloS one, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 12 papers.
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Who cites it
12 citing papers in PubMed.
- Study on the interior equilibrium point of a special class of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric evolutionary games.Royal Society open science · 2024Article
- Super-rational aspiration promotes cooperation in the asymmetric game with peer exit punishment and reward.Heliyon · 2023Article
- Evolution of coordinated punishment to enforce cooperation from an unbiased strategy space.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2019Article
- Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Royal Society open science · 2018Article
- Social Interaction Patterns of the Disabled People in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas.Frontiers in psychology · 2018Article
- Heterogeneous groups overcome the diffusion of responsibility problem in social norm enforcement.PloS one · 2018Article
- Coevolution of Vertex Weights Resolves Social Dilemma in Spatial Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2015Review
- Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2015Article
- Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans.Scientific reports · 2015Article
- Asymmetric interaction paired with a super-rational strategy might resolve the tragedy of the commons without requiring recognition or negotiation.Scientific reports · 2015Article
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3 authors.
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Abstract
It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals). These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a "strong" player is greater than the "weak" players in the model of Diekmann (1993). This contradicts Selten's (1980) model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.
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