ArticleFrontiers in behavioral neuroscience2014
Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments.
Article in Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.
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11 citing papers in PubMed, 54 citations in OpenAlex.
- Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations.Bulletin of mathematical biology · 2024Article
- Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations.Journal of mathematical biology · 2023Article
- The probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff outperforms previous pool and peer punishment.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- A remarkable effect of the combination of probabilistic peer-punishment and coevolutionary mechanism on the evolution of cooperation.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- The evolution of optimal resource allocation and mating systems in hermaphroditic perennial plants.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- Increasing returns to scale: The solution to the second-order social dilemma.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- The coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing in the resource competition game.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.PLoS computational biology · 2015Article
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Authors and funding
2 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.
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Abstract
In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest "equal distribution" scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes.
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