Evidence map›Paper›PMID 25059478›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2014

Evaluation of transmission risks associated with in vivo replication of several high containment pathogens in a biosafety level 4 laboratory.

Judie Alimonti, Anders Leung, Shane Jones, Jason Gren, Xiangguo Qiu, Lisa Fernando, Brittany Balcewich, Gary Wong, Ute Ströher, Allen Grolla and 2 more

Open access · goldAbstract readEvaluation Study
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 21 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
21citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
5.4field-weighted citation impact, top 3% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

21 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 42 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Drivers of African Filovirus (Ebola and Marburg) Outbreaks.Vector borne and zoonotic diseases (Larchmont, N.Y.) · 2022
    Review
  4. Review
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Animal models for filovirus infections.Zoological research · 2018
    Review
  11. Article
  12. Animal Models of Ebolavirus Infection.Comparative medicine · 2017
    Review
  13. Article
  14. Review
  15. Article
  16. Ebola virus disease in nonendemic countries.Journal of the Formosan Medical Association = Taiwan yi zhi · 2015
    Review
  17. Review
  18. Review
  19. Review
  20. Ebola: Implications and Perspectives.Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association · 2015
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

12 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Judie Alimonti1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2].
Anders Leung1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2].
Shane JonesSpecial Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
Jason GrenContainment Services, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
Xiangguo QiuSpecial Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
Lisa FernandoSpecial Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
Brittany BalcewichBioforensics Assay Development and Diagnostics; Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
Gary Wong1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2] Departments of Medical Microbiology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
Ute Ströher1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2].
Allen GrollaSpecial Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba.
James Strong1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2] Departments of Medical Microbiology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada [3] Departments of Pediatrics and Child Health, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada.
Gary Kobinger1] Special Pathogens Program, Public Health Agency of Canada, 1015 Arlington St., Winnipeg. Manitoba [2] Departments of Medical Microbiology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada [3] Departments of Immunology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada [4] Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Public Health Agency of Canada · CAUniversity of Manitoba · CA

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Containment level 4 (CL4) laboratories studying biosafety level 4 viruses are under strict regulations to conduct nonhuman primate (NHP) studies in compliance of both animal welfare and biosafety requirements. NHPs housed in open-barred cages raise concerns about cross-contamination between animals, and accidental exposure of personnel to infectious materials. To address these concerns, two NHP experiments were performed. One examined the simultaneous infection of 6 groups of NHPs with 6 different viruses (Machupo, Junin, Rift Valley Fever, Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever, Nipah and Hendra viruses). Washing personnel between handling each NHP group, floor to ceiling biobubble with HEPA filter, and plexiglass between cages were employed for partial primary containment. The second experiment employed no primary containment around open barred cages with Ebola virus infected NHPs 0.3 meters from naïve NHPs. Viral antigen-specific ELISAs, qRT-PCR and TCID50 infectious assays were utilized to determine antibody levels and viral loads. No transmission of virus to neighbouring NHPs was observed suggesting limited containment protocols are sufficient for multi-viral CL4 experiments within one room. The results support the concept that Ebola virus infection is self-contained in NHPs infected intramuscularly, at least in the present experimental conditions, and is not transmitted to naïve NHPs via an airborne route.

Indexed as

Air FiltersAnimalsAntigens, ViralArenavirusBunyaviridaeContainment of BiohazardsEbolavirusEnzyme-Linked Immunosorbent AssayEquipment ContaminationHemorrhagic Fevers, ViralHenipavirusLaboratoriesMicrobubblesReal-Time Polymerase Chain ReactionRiskRNA, ViralAntigens, ViralRNA, Viral

Identifiers

PMID25059478
PMCPMC5376055
OpenAlexW2117935598

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.