Evidence map›Paper›PMID 25024192›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2014

Public goods in relation to competition, cooperation, and spite.

Simon A Levin

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 34 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
34citing papers in PubMed
44.9field-weighted citation impact, top 1% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

34 citing papers in PubMed, 121 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Biophysical Constraints Dictate the Stability of Social Traits inbioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2026
    Article
  3. Direct and indirect benefits of cooperation in collective defense against predation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Human major transitions from the perspective of distributed adaptations.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Collective self-optimization of communicating active particles.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2021
    Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Social and general intelligence improves collective action in a common pool resource system.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2020
    Article
  15. Decoding collective communications using information theory tools.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2020
    Article
  16. Steering eco-evolutionary game dynamics with manifold control.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2020
    Article
  17. Article
  18. Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2019
    Article
  19. Private provision of public goods by environmental groups.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2019
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author at 1 institution in 2 countries.

Simon A LevinDepartment of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, and Princeton Environmental Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1003; Resources for the Future, Washington, DC 20036; and The Beijer Institute for Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, SE-104 05 Stockholm, Sweden slevin@princeton.edu.
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences · SE

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Public goods and common-pool resources are fundamental features of biological and social systems, and pose core challenges in achieving sustainability; for such situations, the immediate interests of individuals and the societies in which they are embedded are in potential conflict, involving game-theoretic considerations whose resolution need not serve the collective good. Evolution has often confronted such dilemmas--e.g., in bacterial biofilms--in the challenges of cancer, in nitrogen fixation and chelation, in the production of antibiotics, and in collective action problems across animal groups; there is much to learn from the Darwinian resolution of these situations for how to address problems our societies face today. Addressing these problems involves understanding the emergence of cooperative agreements, from reciprocal altruism and insurance arrangements to the social norms and more formal institutions that maintain societies. At the core are the issues of how individuals and societies discount the future and the interests of others, and the degree that individual decisions are influenced by regard for others. Ultimately, as Garrett Hardin suggested, the solution to problems of the commons is in "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon," and hence in how groups of individuals form and how they arrive at decisions that ultimately benefit all.

Indexed as

AltruismCooperative BehaviorInterpersonal RelationsSocial BehaviorAdaptation, PsychologicalHumansProblem SolvingSocial Supportcollective phenomenacomplex adaptive systemsprosociality

Identifiers

PMID25024192
PMCPMC4113917
OpenAlexW2052567105

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.