ArticleScientific reports2014
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations.
Article in Scientific reports, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 29 papers.
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Who cites it
29 citing papers in PubMed.
- Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games.Nature communications · 2025Article
- Conditional cooperation with longer memory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation.PNAS nexus · 2023Article
- Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- The evolutionary extortion game of multiple groups in hypernetworks.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games.Royal Society open science · 2021Article
- Social dilemmas among unequals.Nature · 2019Article
- Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2019Article
- Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.Nature communications · 2018Article
- Network effects on coordination in asymmetric games.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Divide-and-conquer Tournament on Social Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Coevolution of Vertex Weights Resolves Social Dilemma in Spatial Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- Extortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner's dilemma.Nature communications · 2016Article
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2 authors.
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Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.
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