ArticleNature communications2014
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner's dilemma.
Article in Nature communications, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 31 papers.
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Who cites it
31 citing papers in PubMed.
- Conditional cooperation with longer memory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Enhancing social cohesion with cooperative bots in societies of greedy, mobile individuals.PNAS nexus · 2024Article
- Individualistic attitudes in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma undermine evolutionary fitness and may drive cooperative human players to extinction.Royal Society open science · 2024Article
- Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation.PNAS nexus · 2023Article
- The coordination of collective and individual solutions in risk-resistant scenarios.The European physical journal. B · 2023Article
- Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2022Article
- Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games.PNAS nexus · 2022Article
- Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games.Royal Society open science · 2021Article
- The interplay of emotion expressions and strategy in promoting cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- Strategically influencing an uncertain future.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- Evolution of cooperation on temporal networks.Nature communications · 2020Article
- Article
- Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain.Nature communications · 2019Article
- Environment-based preference selection promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game.Scientific reports · 2018Article
- Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity.Scientific reports · 2018Article
- Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.Nature communications · 2017Article
- Individual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma.Frontiers in psychology · 2017Article
- Small groups and long memories promote cooperation.Scientific reports · 2016Article
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3 authors.
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Abstract
Extortion is the practice of obtaining advantages through explicit forces and threats. Recently, it was demonstrated that even the repeated prisoner's dilemma, one of the key models to explain mutual cooperation, allows for implicit forms of extortion. According to the theory, extortioners demand and receive an excessive share of any surplus, which allows them to outperform any adapting co-player. To explore the performance of such strategies against humans, we have designed an economic experiment in which participants were matched either with an extortioner or with a generous co-player. Although extortioners succeeded against each of their human opponents, extortion resulted in lower payoffs than generosity. Human subjects showed a strong concern for fairness: they punished extortion by refusing to fully cooperate, thereby reducing their own, and even more so, the extortioner's gains. Thus, the prospects of extorting others in social relationships seem limited; in the long run, generosity is more profitable.
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