ArticleJournal of theoretical biology2014
Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions.
Article in Journal of theoretical biology, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 16 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
16 citing papers in PubMed.
- The social leverage effect: Institutions transform weak reputation effects into strong incentives for cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Can institutions foster cooperation by wealth redistribution?Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- The coordination of collective and individual solutions in risk-resistant scenarios.The European physical journal. B · 2023Article
- Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding.Nature communications · 2022Article
- Authority or Autonomy? Exploring Interactions between Central and Peer Punishments in Risk-Resistant Scenarios.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2022Article
- The probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff outperforms previous pool and peer punishment.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Egoistic punishment outcompetes altruistic punishment in the spatial public goods game.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Evolution of coordinated punishment to enforce cooperation from an unbiased strategy space.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2019Article
- The competitive advantage of institutional reward.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2019Article
- When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Increasing returns to scale: The solution to the second-order social dilemma.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment.Biology letters · 2016Article
- Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games.Journal of theoretical biology · 2015Article
- Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations.Scientific reports · 2015Article
- Punish the thief-coevolution of defense and cautiousness stabilizes ownership.Behavioral ecology and sociobiologyArticle
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
Abstract
In many species, mutual cooperation is stabilized by forms of policing and peer punishment: if cheaters are punished, there is a strong selective pressure to cooperate. Most human societies have complemented, and sometimes even replaced, such peer punishment mechanisms with pool punishment, where punishment is outsourced to central institutions such as the police. Even before free-riding occurs, such institutions require investments, which could serve as costly signals. Here, we show with a game theoretical model that this signaling effect in turn can be crucial for the evolution of punishment institutions: In the absence of such signals, pool punishment is only stable with second-order punishment and can only evolve when individuals have the freedom not to take part in any interaction. With such signals, individuals can opportunistically adjust their behavior, which promotes the evolution of stable pool punishment even in situations where no one can stand aside. Thus, the human propensity to react opportunistically to credible punishment threats is often sufficient to establish stable punishment institutions and to maintain high levels of cooperation.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.