ArticleScientific reports2014
Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility.
Article in Scientific reports, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.
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Who cites it
10 citing papers in PubMed.
- Evolution of cooperation in costly institutions exhibits Red Queen and Black Queen dynamics in heterogeneous public goods.Communications biology · 2021Article
- Freedom to choose between public resources promotes cooperation.PLoS computational biology · 2021Article
- Nutrient status shapes selfish mitochondrial genome dynamics across different levels of selection.eLife · 2020Article
- Piloting restoration initiatives in subtropical scrub forest: specifying areas asserting adaptive management.Environmental monitoring and assessment · 2019Article
- Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game.PLoS computational biology · 2018Article
- Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Emergence and Evolution of Cooperation Under Resource Pressure.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Article
- The coevolution of overconfidence and bluffing in the resource competition game.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments.Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience · 2014Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.