Evidence map›Paper›PMID 24505286›Full record

SynthesisPloS one2014

How does the tobacco industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review.

Emily Savell, Anna B Gilmore, Gary Fooks

Abstract readSystematic Review
In one paragraph

Synthesis in PloS one, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 127 papers, 4 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
127citing papers in PubMed, 4 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

127 citing papers in PubMed, 4 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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67 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Emily SavellDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom ; UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies, Bath, United Kingdom.
Anna B GilmoreDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom ; UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies, Bath, United Kingdom.
Gary FooksDepartment for Health, University of Bath, Bath, United Kingdom ; UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies, Bath, United Kingdom.

Funding

Tobacco Companies, Global Governance and Public HealthR01CA160695 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF BATH · PI GILMORE, ANNA B · 2011 to 2013
$1.3M
Medical Research Council MR/K023195/1NCI NIH HHS R01 CA160695NCI NIH HHS R01CA160695
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe Framework Convention on Tobacco Control makes a number of recommendations aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products. Tobacco industry political activity has been identified as an obstacle to Parties' development and implementation of these provisions. This study systematically reviews the existing literature on tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations and develops taxonomies of 1) industry strategies and tactics and 2) industry frames and arguments.

methodsSearches were conducted between April-July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Articles were included if they made reference to tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations; supported claims with verifiable evidence; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990-2013. 48 articles met the review criteria. Narrative synthesis was used to combine the evidence.

results56% of articles focused on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, the rest focusing on Asia (17%), South America, Africa or transnational activity. Six main political strategies and four main frames were identified. The tobacco industry frequently claims that the proposed policy will have negative unintended consequences, that there are legal barriers to regulation, and that the regulation is unnecessary because, for example, industry does not market to youth or adheres to a voluntary code. The industry primarily conveys these arguments through direct and indirect lobbying, the promotion of voluntary codes and alternative policies, and the formation of alliances with other industrial sectors. The majority of tactics and arguments were used in multiple jurisdictions.

conclusionsTobacco industry political activity is far more diverse than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political activity. Tactics and arguments are repeated across jurisdictions, suggesting that the taxonomies of industry tactics and arguments developed in this paper are generalisable to multiple jurisdictions and can be used to predict industry activity.

Indexed as

MarketingPoliticsTobacco IndustryHumans

Identifiers

PMID24505286
PMCPMC3914831

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.