ArticleBiology letters2014
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games.
Article in Biology letters, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
11 citing papers in PubMed.
- Article
- Co-Evolution of Complex Network Public Goods Game under the Edges Rules.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2020Article
- Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2019Article
- Antisocial rewarding in structured populations.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation.Scientific reports · 2015Article
- Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2015Article
- Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations.Scientific reports · 2015Article
- The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2015Article
- Group Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation.PloS one · 2015Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Properly coordinating cooperation is relevant for resolving public good problems, such as clean energy and environmental protection. However, little is known about how individuals can coordinate themselves for a certain level of cooperation in large populations of strangers. In a typical situation, a consensus-building process rarely succeeds, owing to a lack of face and standing. The evolution of cooperation in this type of situation is studied here using threshold public good games, in which cooperation prevails when it is initially sufficient, or otherwise it perishes. While punishment is a powerful tool for shaping human behaviours, institutional punishment is often too costly to start with only a few contributors, which is another coordination problem. Here, we show that whatever the initial conditions, reward funds based on voluntary contribution can evolve. The voluntary reward paves the way for effectively overcoming the coordination problem and efficiently transforms freeloaders into cooperators with a perceived small risk of collective failure.
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