Evidence map›Paper›PMID 24427144›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in psychology2013

The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy.

Thomas Metzinger

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 22 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
22citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

22 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Review
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  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. How deep is the rift between conscious states in sleep and wakefulness? Spontaneous experience over the sleep-wake cycle.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
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  12. Minds and Brains, Sleep and Psychiatry.Psychiatric research and clinical practice · 2021
    Review
  13. Review
  14. Why does the mind wander?Neuroscience of consciousness · 2019
    Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Dynamical Relations in the Self-Pattern.Frontiers in psychology · 2018
    Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Thomas MetzingerPhilosophisches Seminar, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany ; Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call "conscious thought" is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called "conscious thought" in the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like "mind wandering" into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness. In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the "self-representational blink" (SRB) and a sudden shift in the phenomenological "unit of identification" (UI). I close by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.

Indexed as

cognitive phenomenologyconsciousnessepistemic agencymeditationmental autonomymind wanderingself-consciousnesssubpersonal processes

Identifiers

PMID24427144
PMCPMC3868016

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.