ArticlePLoS computational biology2013
Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games.
Article in PLoS computational biology, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 29 papers.
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29 citing papers in PubMed.
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- The evolution of social behaviors and risk preferences in settings with uncertainty.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Cooperation among unequal players with aspiration-driven learning.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Weak Selection and the Separation of Eco-evo Time Scales using Perturbation Analysis.Bulletin of mathematical biology · 2022Article
- Evolution of prosocial behaviours in multilayer populations.Nature human behaviour · 2022Article
- Evolution of cooperation with joint liability.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2022Article
- Intriguing effects of selection intensity on the evolution of prosocial behaviors.PLoS computational biology · 2021Article
- Aspiration dynamics generate robust predictions in heterogeneous populations.Nature communications · 2021Article
- Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies.Nature human behaviour · 2020Article
- The cancellation effect at the group level.Evolution; international journal of organic evolution · 2020Article
- Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2019Article
- Fixation properties of multiple cooperator configurations on regular graphs.Theory in biosciences = Theorie in den Biowissenschaften · 2019Article
- Computation and Simulation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games.Journal of mathematical biology · 2019Article
- Individualised aspiration dynamics: Calculation by proofs.PLoS computational biology · 2018Article
- Evolutionary regime transitions in structured populations.PloS one · 2018Article
- The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory.Journal of mathematical biology · 2017Article
- Coevolutionary dynamics of phenotypic diversity and contingent cooperation.PLoS computational biology · 2017Article
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4 authors.
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Abstract
In evolutionary games, reproductive success is determined by payoffs. Weak selection means that even large differences in game outcomes translate into small fitness differences. Many results have been derived using weak selection approximations, in which perturbation analysis facilitates the derivation of analytical results. Here, we ask whether results derived under weak selection are also qualitatively valid for intermediate and strong selection. By "qualitatively valid" we mean that the ranking of strategies induced by an evolutionary process does not change when the intensity of selection increases. For two-strategy games, we show that the ranking obtained under weak selection cannot be carried over to higher selection intensity if the number of players exceeds two. For games with three (or more) strategies, previous examples for multiplayer games have shown that the ranking of strategies can change with the intensity of selection. In particular, rank changes imply that the most abundant strategy at one intensity of selection can become the least abundant for another. We show that this applies already to pairwise interactions for a broad class of evolutionary processes. Even when both weak and strong selection limits lead to consistent predictions, rank changes can occur for intermediate intensities of selection. To analyze how common such games are, we show numerically that for randomly drawn two-player games with three or more strategies, rank changes frequently occur and their likelihood increases rapidly with the number of strategies [Formula: see text]. In particular, rank changes are almost certain for [Formula: see text], which jeopardizes the predictive power of results derived for weak selection.
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