ArticleProceedings. Biological sciences2014
High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment.
Article in Proceedings. Biological sciences, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.
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Who cites it
7 citing papers in PubMed.
- Religiosity and gender bias structure social networks.Evolutionary human sciences · 2024Article
- Communicating emotions, but not expressing them privately, reduces moral punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma game.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Anthropological Prosociality via Sub-Group Level Selection.Integrative psychological & behavioral science · 2022Article
- Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Punishment: one tool, many uses.Evolutionary human sciences · 2019Review
- Dopamine-System Genes and Cultural Acquisition: The Norm Sensitivity Hypothesis.Current opinion in psychology · 2016Article
- Sanctions as honest signals--the evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions.Journal of theoretical biology · 2014Article
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
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Abstract
As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.
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