ArticleScientific reports2013
Braess's paradox in epidemic game: better condition results in less payoff.
Article in Scientific reports, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 26 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
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Who cites it
26 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.
- Behavioural change models for infectious disease transmission: a systematic review (2010-2015).Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2016Pooled it
- Modeling and analysis of infectious diseases based on behavioral game theory on two-layered networks under media coverage.PloS one · 2025Article
- The impact of the self-recognition ability and physical quality on coupled negative information-behavior-epidemic dynamics in multiplex networks.Chaos, solitons, and fractals · 2023Article
- Game-Theoretic Frameworks for Epidemic Spreading and Human Decision-Making: A Review.Dynamic games and applications · 2022Article
- How disease risk awareness modulates transmission: coupling infectious disease models with behavioural dynamics.Royal Society open science · 2022Article
- Impacts of social distancing on the spread of infectious diseases with asymptomatic infection: A mathematical model.Applied mathematics and computation · 2021Article
- Modeling the competitive diffusions of rumor and knowledge and the impacts on epidemic spreading.Applied mathematics and computation · 2021Article
- Effects of asymptomatic infection on the dynamical interplay between behavior and disease transmission in multiplex networks.Physica A · 2019Article
- Coevolution spreading in complex networks.Physics reports · 2019Review
- The impact of rare but severe vaccine adverse events on behaviour-disease dynamics: a network model.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- Infection prevention behaviour and infectious disease modelling: a review of the literature and recommendations for the future.BMC public health · 2018Review
- Exploring Voluntary Vaccinating Behaviors using Evolutionary N-person Threshold Games.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Voluntary Vaccination through Self-organizing Behaviors on Locally-mixed Social Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Interplay between epidemic spread and information propagation on metapopulation networks.Journal of theoretical biology · 2017Article
- Disease dynamics in a stochastic network game: a little empathy goes a long way in averting outbreaks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Effects of awareness diffusion and self-initiated awareness behavior on epidemic spreading - An approach based on multiplex networks.Communications in nonlinear science & numerical simulation · 2017Article
- Pattern transitions in spatial epidemics: Mechanisms and emergent properties.Physics of life reviews · 2016Review
- A social contagious model of the obesity epidemic.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- How the initial level of visibility and limited resource affect the evolution of cooperation.Scientific reports · 2016Article
- An evolutionary vaccination game in the modified activity driven network by considering the closeness.Physica A · 2016Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
5 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, and could adjust their strategies according to their neighbors' strategies and payoffs at the beginning of each new season of epidemic spreading. We found a counter-intuitive phenomenon analogous to the well-known Braess's Paradox, namely a better condition may lead to worse performance. Specifically speaking, increasing the successful rate of self-protection does not necessarily reduce the epidemic size or improve the system payoff. The range and degree of the Braess's Paradox are sensitive to both the parameters characterizing the epidemic spreading and the strategy payoff, while the existence of the Braess's Paradox is insensitive to the network topologies. This phenomenon can be well explained by a mean-field approximation. Our study demonstrates an important fact that a better condition for individuals may yield a worse outcome for the society.
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