Evidence map›Paper›PMID 24134922›Full record

Trial reportHealth policy and planning2014

The impact of performance incentives on child health outcomes: results from a cluster randomized controlled trial in the Philippines.

John W Peabody, Riti Shimkhada, Stella Quimbo, Orville Solon, Xylee Javier, Charles McCulloch

Abstract readRandomized Controlled Trial
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Trial report in Health policy and planning, 2014. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 27 papers, 4 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
27citing papers in PubMed, 4 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

27 citing papers in PubMed, 4 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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  14. The Cholera Phone: Diarrheal Disease Surveillance by Mobile Phone in Bangladesh.The American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene · 2019
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

John W PeabodyInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USAInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA peabody@psg.ucsf.edu.
Riti ShimkhadaInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USAInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Stella QuimboInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Orville SolonInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Xylee JavierInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Charles McCullochInstitute for Global Health, Global Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA, QURE Healthcare, San Rafael, CA 94901, USA, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman and Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA.

Funding

The Philippine Child Health and Policy ExperimentR01HD042117 · NICHD · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI PEABODY, JOHN W · 2003 to 2007
$2.5M
NICHD NIH HHS R01 HD042117
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Improving clinical performance using measurement and payment incentives, including pay for performance (or P4P), has, so far, shown modest to no benefit on patient outcomes. Our objective was to assess the impact of a P4P programme on paediatric health outcomes in the Philippines. We used data from the Quality Improvement Demonstration Study. In this study, the P4P intervention, introduced in 2004, was randomly assigned to 10 community district hospitals, which were matched to 10 control sites. At all sites, physician quality was measured using Clinical Performance Vignettes (CPVs) among randomly selected physicians every 6 months over a 36-month period. In the hospitals randomized to the P4P intervention, physicians received bonus payments if they met qualifying scores on the CPV. We measured health outcomes 4-10 weeks after hospital discharge among children 5 years of age and under who had been hospitalized for diarrhoea and pneumonia (the two most common illnesses affecting this age cohort) and had been under the care of physicians participating in the study. Health outcomes data collection was done at baseline/pre-intervention and 2 years post-intervention on the following post-discharge outcomes: (1) age-adjusted wasting, (2) C-reactive protein in blood, (3) haemoglobin level and (4) parental assessment of child's health using general self-reported health (GSRH) measure. To evaluate changes in health outcomes in the control vs intervention sites over time (baseline vs post-intervention), we used a difference-in-difference logistic regression analysis, controlling for potential confounders. We found an improvement of 7 and 9 percentage points in GSRH and wasting over time (post-intervention vs baseline) in the intervention sites relative to the control sites (P ≤ 0.001). The results from this randomized social experiment indicate that the introduction of a performance-based incentive programme, which included measurement and feedback, led to improvements in two important child health outcomes.

Indexed as

Child HealthReimbursement, IncentiveChild, PreschoolDiarrheaFemaleHealth PolicyHospitals, CommunityHumansInfantInfant, NewbornMalePediatricsPhilippinesPhysiciansPneumoniaQuality Improvementchild healthhealth policyPay for performancePhilippinesquality of care

Identifiers

PMID24134922
PMCPMC4124243

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.