Evidence map›Paper›PMID 24046364›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2013

Public goods dilemma in asexual ant societies.

Shigeto Dobata, Kazuki Tsuji

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed
1.6field-weighted citation impact, top 16% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed, 35 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
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  8. Development of social systems neuroscience using macaques.Proceedings of the Japan Academy. Series B, Physical and biological sciences · 2018
    Review
  9. The role of public goods in planetary evolution.Philosophical transactions. Series A, Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2017
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Cheating and punishment in cooperative animal societies.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2016
    Review
  13. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Shigeto DobataDepartment of Subtropical Agro-Environmental Sciences, Faculty of Agriculture, University of the Ryukyus, Nishihara, Okinawa 903-0213, Japan.
Kazuki Tsuji
University of the Ryukyus · JP

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Cooperation in biological, social, and economic groups is underpinned by public goods that are generated by group members at some personal cost. Theory predicts that public goods will be exploited by cheaters who benefit from the goods by not paying for them, thereby leading to the collapse of cooperation. This situation, described as the "public goods dilemma" in game theory, makes the ubiquity of cooperation a major evolutionary puzzle. Despite this generalization, the demonstration of genetic background and fitness effects of the public goods dilemma has been limited to interactions between viruses and between cells, and thus its relevance at higher levels of organismal complexity is still largely unexplored. Here we provide experimental evidence for the public goods dilemma in a social insect, the ant Pristomyrmex punctatus. In this species, all workers are involved in both asexual reproduction and cooperative tasks. Genetic cheaters infiltrate field colonies, reproducing more than the workers but shunning cooperative tasks. In laboratory experiments, cheaters outcompeted coexisting workers in both survival and reproduction, although a group composed only of cheaters failed to produce offspring. The operations of the public goods dilemma in P. punctatus showed a remarkable convergence with those in microbial societies, not only in fitness consequences but also in behavioral mechanisms. Our study reinforces the evolutionary impact of cheaters on diverse cooperative systems in the laboratory and in the field.

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionCooperative BehaviorSocial BehaviorAnimalsAntsBehavior, AnimalGenetic FitnessJapanLikelihood FunctionsLinear ModelsReproduction, Asexualphenotypic plasticitypublic goods gameself-organizationsocial evolutionsocial parasitism

Identifiers

PMID24046364
PMCPMC3791774
OpenAlexW2049485899

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.