Evidence map›Paper›PMID 23959086›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2013

Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation.

Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 47 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
47citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

47 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Promoters of cooperation in evolutionary games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
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  10. Evolution of cooperation on large networks with community structure.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2019
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Zhen Wang1] Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong [2] Center for Nonlinear Studies and the Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex Systems, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.
Attila Szolnoki
Matjaž Perc

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.

Indexed as

Choice BehaviorCooperative BehaviorDecision MakingGame TheoryModels, TheoreticalComputer Simulation

Identifiers

PMID23959086
PMCPMC3747507

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.