ArticleNature communications2013
Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything.
Article in Nature communications, 2013. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 37 papers.
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37 citing papers in PubMed.
- Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- Repeated games with partner choice.PLoS computational biology · 2025Article
- Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.PloS one · 2024Article
- Evidence that cultural groups differ in their abilities to detect fake accents.Evolutionary human sciences · 2024Article
- Outlearning extortioners: unbending strategies can foster reciprocal fairness and cooperation.PNAS nexus · 2023Article
- Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- The evolutionary extortion game of multiple groups in hypernetworks.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- The conditional defector strategies can violate the most crucial supporting mechanisms of cooperation.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Memory-two zero-determinant strategies in repeated games.Royal Society open science · 2021Article
- Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game.PLoS computational biology · 2021Article
- Using a theory of mind to find best responses to memory-one strategies.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- Game Theory in Mobile CrowdSensing:A Comprehensive Survey.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2020Review
- Article
- Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.Nature communications · 2018Article
- Article
- Divide-and-conquer Tournament on Social Networks.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Reinforcement learning produces dominant strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.PloS one · 2017Article
- Evolution of cooperation in a particular case of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with three strategies.Journal of mathematical biology · 2016Article
Corrections and comments
- Erratum issued
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Zero-determinant strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's strategy (coercive strategies), or else to set the ratio between the player's and their opponent's expected payoff (extortionate strategies). Here we show that zero-determinant strategies are at most weakly dominant, are not evolutionarily stable, and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that zero-determinant strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize each other can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition.
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